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NEW WINE, OLD WINESKINS:
APPLICATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
TO WEB-BASED ACTIVITY
KATHERINE

G. GRINCEWICH, ESQ.*

I. COPYRIGHT BASICS
A copyrighted work is an original work of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression now known or later
developed, from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated either directly or with the aid of a
machine. Copyrighted works include: literary works, musical
works, including any accompanying words, dramatic works,
choreographic or pantomime works, pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works, motion picture and other audiovisual works,
sound recordings and architectural works. Ideas, processes,
systems, and method of operations cannot be copyrighted works.
A. Copyright: The Bundle of Rights
A copyright owner has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: (1) reproduce the copyrighted
work; (2) prepare derivative works (a work based upon a
preexisting work(s),
"such as
a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)); (3) distribute copies to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending; (4) perform the copyrighted work publicly (if it is a
literary, musical, dramatic, or a choreographic work, motion
picture, or pantomime); (5) display publicly (if it is a literary,
dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, a
pantomime, or the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work). 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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1. Examples
Computer functions that fall within these categories of
exclusive rights include creating a website, downloading and
uploading, linking and framing. Text, art works, and computer
software language are copyrightable works. Loading software
into a computer constitutes creation of a copy under the
Copyright Act. A copy is made when a computer program is
transferred from a permanent storage device to a computer's
random access memory (that is, when a computer is turned on,
when a document is viewed, when a computer user double-clicks
on a hypertext link) or the read only memory ("ROM") as
explained in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991
F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1033 (1994).
2. Music
Several rights within the "bundle of rights" which comprise
a copyright are at issue when a website includes music.
Public Performance Right: The composer of a musical
composition controls the public performance of his composition.
A public performance is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) as a
performance at a "place open to the public or at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances," or a transmission or other
communication of a performance of a work to a public place or to
the public by means of a device. Licenses for public performance
are most often obtained through clearinghouses: the American
Society of Composers Authors & Publishers ("ASCAP"),
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), or SESAC are authorized by
composers to issue licenses.
Synchronization Right: If the musical composition is
synchronized with visual images (that is, used as a soundtrack to
a motion picture or television program), a synchronization
Synchronization fees are usually split
license is required.
between the music publisher and the composer. Synchronization
licenses can be obtained from the Harry Fox Agency.
Master Recording License: If the website operation uses a
particular sound recording of a song, he must obtain permission
to use that recording (a "master recording license"). Usually, the
record company owns the copyright in the sound recording.
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B. Who holds the copyright in a work?
l.A copyrighted work is created when it is fixed in a tangible
medium. The creator of the work is the copyright owner, unless
the work is a work made for hire.
2.What is a work made for hire? The Copyright Act defines
a work made for hire as either: (1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his employment, or (2) a work
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to (a)
a collective work, (b) part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, (constitution) a translation, (defendant) a
supplementary work, (e) a compilation, (f) an instructional text,
(g) a test, (h) an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire. 17 U. S. C. § 101 (2000).
Therefore, for a work created by a non-employee to be a
work made for hire owned by the entity which commissioned it,
(1) the work must fall into one of the categories listed in the Act,
(2) there must be a writing signed by both parties (not an e-mail)
before the work commenced (because copyright is created when a
tangible work is created), and (3) the writing must state clearly
that the work is a work made for hire.
This definition of a work made for hire gives rise to a
critically important principal of copyright law: an independent
contractor owns his copyrighted work, even if he has been paid
by the contracting entity, unless there is a writing, executed
before the contractor creates the work, which states that the
contracting entity will own the copyright. To ensure that the
commissioning entity will hold the copyright, additional
language should be included in the agreement between
commissioning entity and contractor, stating that if the work is
not considered a work for hire, the contractor grants the
copyright to the commissioning entity.
Thus, if a non-employee is hired to create a web page, make
changes in web pages, or other similar website creation activity,
to ensure ownership of that work, the owner of the website
should sign an agreement with the contractor granting copyright
in the contractor's work to the website owner.
For purposes of works for hire, the definition of an employee
is clear. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined
employment according to the rules of agency: does the
commissioning party have the right to control (a) the manner
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and means by which the product is created, (b) the contractor's
future work, i.e. can it assign additional projects, (constitution)
the location of the work, (defendant) the work hours, the
duration of the relationship, (e) the method of payment, (f) the
hiring and payment of assistants; does the contractor own his
tools, does the commissioning entity pay employee benefits,
including the payment of taxes, is the work part of the
commissioning entities regular work, is the commissioning entity
a business?
C. Infringement
A direct infringement occurs when a person or entity (not
the copyright owner), exercises one or more of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner without permission and when the
exercise is not a fair use (see below for definition of fair use).
One who violates any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights
bears the burden of establishing that the violation is not an
infringement of copyright, punishable by fines and incarceration,
but rather falls within one of the narrow exceptions to the Act's
prohibitions against infringement.
The most often used
exception is fair use. Fair use of a copyrighted work is defined in
section 107 of the Copyright Act as a reproduction of a
copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies of classroom use),
scholarship, or research. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). A fair use is
not an infringement of copyright.
The Copyright Act's fair use definition does not include a
precisely defined list of categories of uses deemed "fair" uses.
Rather, Congress intended that the statutory definition of fair
use restate the judicial doctrine of fair use. The legislative
history of section 107 states that a determination of whether a
particular use is a fair use is to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Four factors set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) must be
used to make an individual determination of whether copying a
copyrighted work is a fair use: "(1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

It is vital to recognize that fair use is not a blanket exception
to the copyright laws for not-for-profit entities such as Catholic
schools and parishes.
1. Vicarious Liability for Infringement
Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is imposed if
defendant (1) has the right and the ability to supervise the
infringing activity; and (2) has a direct financial interest in such
activities. See Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession
Services, Inc. 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992). Vicarious
liability is based on the tort concept of respondeat superior,
which raises considerations of benefit and control.
2. Contributory Infringement
Liability for contributory infringement is imposed when
defendant, (1) with knowledge of the infringing activity, (2)
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
Contributory liability is based on the concept of enterprise
liability, which entails knowledge and participation.
3. Case Law
On-Line
E]Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom
Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995). Plaintiffs, Religious Technology Center ("RTC"), held
copyrights in the works of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the
Defendant Erlich was a former
Church of Scientology.
Scientology minister turned critic of the church, who created an
on-line forum for discussion and criticism of the church on a
Usenet newsgroup (Usenet is a collection of electronic bulletin
board services ("BBS")). Erlich posted portions of Hubbard's
works, in violation of RTC's copyrights. RTC contacted Erlich to
stop posting the material, then contacted the BBS operator who
provided Erlich with Internet access and Netcom On-Line
Communications (the owner of computer facilities which
provided the BBS operator with Internet access) to refuse Erlich
Internet access. After all refused, RTC sued all of these entities,
including Netcom, for copyright infringement. The court held
that RTC had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
Netcom's liability for contributory infringement. -The court

42 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 1

determined that Netcom may, by virtue of its receipt of RTC's
complaint against Erlich, have had knowledge of the copyright
infringement, but it may also not known enough to determine if
Erlich had a fair use defense. Further, a question of fact existed
as to whether Netcom should have examined Erlich's postings to
view RTC's copyright notice or other indicia of RTC's ownership.
A further question of fact was raised as to whether Netcom was
able to take simple measures, following RTC's notice, to remove
Erlich's postings.
The court further held that RTC also raised a genuine issue
of material fact regarding vicarious infringement. Netcom may
have the right and ability to control its subscribers activities.
Netcom's terms and conditions, to which subscribers must agree,
provide that Netcom has the right to take remedial action if a
user violates copyright law. Netcom had in fact suspended the
accounts of users on many occasions, and Netcom may have had
to ability to make easy modifications to its existing software to
identify the contents of users' postings. When the defendant
rents space or provides services on a fixed fee, which does not
depend on the lessee's activity or income, courts will usually find
no vicarious liability. Here, the court held that Netcom charged
a fixed fee, and the court could find no evidence that Netcom
Plaintiffs claim that
benefitted from Erlich's infringement.
Netcom should be held vicariously liable, therefore, failed.
[]Marobie-Fl v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Dist., 983 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Defendant National Association of
Fire Equipment Districts posted plaintiffs copyrighted clip art
on its web page. Marobie sued both NAFED and its Internet
provider, Northwest. The court noted that the degree to which
Northwest controlled or monitored the contents of the web page
was unclear, but since NAFED paid a one-time set up fee and a
flat fee thereafter, and Northwest never stood to gain financially
based on the contents of NAFED's web page or the amount of
hits it received, Northwest could not be held vicariously liable.
Although Northwest did not directly infringe upon Marobie's
works, it still could be held liable for contributory infringement if
it had knowledge and it assisted in the relevant infringement.
The facts were unclear concerning Northwest's knowledge that
the material on NAFED's web page was copyrighted, thereby
precluding a summary judgment in favor of either party on that
issue.
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0 Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (Utah 1999). Defendants ULM posted
plaintiffs copyrighted Church Handbook of Instructions
("Handbook") on their website. After defendants were ordered to
remove the Handbook, they placed a notice on their website
indicating three other website addresses containing the same
Handbook. They also posted e-mails encouraging others to visit
those websites, print the Handbook from them, and pass it on to
others. The plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief.
The court concluded that the defendants would not be held
contributorily liable for the actions of the operators of the three
websites because defendants did not provide them with the
infringing material, nor did the defendants receive any
compensation from them. Because the only connection between
them was the defendant's posted information on its website, the
court found that the plaintiff had not shown that ULM induced,
caused, or materially contributed to the infringement of the
website operators.
The court did find, however, a substantial likelihood that the
plaintiffs would prove the defendants were contributorily liable
for the infringement of those who browse the three websites,
whether or not they print out copies of the Handbook. Those
who browse the material on the websites infringe the Church's
copyright by virtue of the fact that the random access memory of
the computer makes a transitory copy to permit viewing of the
material. Because the defendants had strongly encouraged
others to view and copy the Handbook, send it to the media, and
post it on other websites, the court held that there was a
substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in
proving that ULM had induced, caused, or materially
contributed to the infringement.
[A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001). Napster used and controlled more sophisticated computer
functions than mere postings, references, or even links to use
copyrighted materials. Napster created and controlled computer
systems specifically designed to register its users, allow users (1)
to compile and store lists of other account holders' user names,
(2) compile, play, and store copyrighted audio files, and (3)
distribute to others copyrighted audio files.
Virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted
music, without the permission of, or payment of license fees to,
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the copyright owners. Almost 90% of the music contained in the
Napster computer system was copyrighted. Thus, Napster users
engage in direct copyright-infringement. Napster executives
actually knew that their system was being used to infringe music
copyright, and encouraged that use (numerous memos from the
executives stated that they knew that music was pirated, and
that they should encourage additional demand for that music;
the Recording Industry Association of America notified Napster
by letter that more than 12,000 copies of copyrighted music
existed in Napster's system).
Napster contributed to the direct infringement by
specifically designing software, search engines, servers and
connections among users so that users can copy and distribute
copyrighted music. These systems do far more than mere
links-they are designed for the purpose of copying and
distributing copyrighted music.
Napster was enjoined from engaging in, or facilitating others
in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing
copyrighted music, which was deemed by the district court to
constitute contributory copyright infringement. Napster (1) had
actual knowledge of direct infringement of copyrighted music by
Napster users, and (2) materially contributed to its users' direct
infringement. To prove contributory infringement, a plaintiff
need not even show actual knowledge; a showing that the
defendant had reason to know would suffice. Further, the
knowledge element is also satisfied when, as here, Napster knew
generally that third parties were violating copyright holders'
rights, even if it did not know at any given time precisely which
copyrighted work was being infringed by which specific user.
Napster was enjoined also from vicariously infringing
copyrighted materials; the district court held that Napster had
the right and ability to supervise users' infringing activity and
had a direct financial interest in that activity.
Napster
essentially admitted that it has the ability to supervise the
infringing activity by describing in detail its methods of blocking
users about whose activities copyright owners complain.
Further, even though Napster never made a profit, it did have a
direct financial interest in the infringing activity. Its own
memos state that it intended to build a larger and larger loyal
base of users through no-fee services so that it could later engage
in revenue-generating business with those users.
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D. Penaltiesfor Copyright Infringement
1. Permanent or temporary injunctions. 17 U.S.C. § 502
(2000).
2. Impoundment of infringing copies during the pendency of
an infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. §503(a) (2000).
3. Destruction of infringing copies following final judicial
determination of copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)
(2000).
4. Damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
(a)
The copyright owner may elect to collect actual
damages suffered as a result of the infringement
and any profits acquired by the infringer as a result
of the infringement. To collect profits, a copyright
owner need only show that the infringer had gross
revenue. The burden then is on the infringer to
prove which of those revenues are attributable only
to the copyrighted work and which are not, and to
identify any expenses which reduce the profits to be
disgorged. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000).
The copyright owner may elect to collect statutory
(b)
damages, instead of actual damages and any
profits. These are set by a court, but may not be
less than $500 or more than $30,000. 17 U.S.C. §
504.
(c)
Statutory damages for willful infringement can be
set by a court at $150,000 or less. To collect
statutory damages or attorney fees, the copyright
owner must register the work.
If the infringer proves that it was not aware and
(d)
had no reason to believe that his acts constituted
an infringement, the court in its discretion may
reduce the statutory damages to $200.
5. Costs and attorney's fees may be awarded by the court in
a civil infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
6. Criminal Penalties. The government may seek criminal
penalties if an infringer's acts were both willful and for
commercial advantage or private financial gain. The penalties
are imposition of a fine of $10,000 or less and imprisonment for
one year or less (except that the penalty for infringement of a
motion picture is a $25,000 or less fine and one-year
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imprisonment, and a $50,000 fine and two-year imprisonment
for any subsequent offense). Further, all infringing copies must
be seized, and may be destroyed.
7. Civil actions have a three year statute of limitations;
criminal actions have a five year statute of limitation. 17 U.S.C.
§507 (2000).
E. Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Online Copyright Liability
Limitation
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C.
§512 (2000), was intended by Congress to provide greater
certainty as to standards of liability for copyright infringement
which occur on the facilities of an online services provider. The
DMCA immunizes online service providers under certain
circumstances from copyright infringement actions. It defines an
online service provider ("OSP") as an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by
the user, of material of the user's choosing, without modifying
the content of that material (17 U.S.C. §512 (2000)), that is, a
company which is paid to primarily to provide access to the
Internet. The limits on liability offered to OSPs are that the
OSP is not liable for any monetary damages and is only subject
to an injunction requiring the OSP to terminate the account of
an identified subscriber who is infringing, or to block access to a
specific online location outside the United States.
To qualify for the liability limitations of the DMCA, an OSP
must adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating in
appropriate circumstances the accounts of subscribers who are
repeat infringers and inform its subscribers and account holders
of this policy, and must not interfere with standard technical
measures used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works. Further, the OSP's limited liability applies
where (1) the transmission of the infringing material is initiated
by someone other than the OSP, (2) the transmission is carried
out by an automatic technical process without selection by the
OSP, (3) the OSP does not select the material's recipients, (4) the
transmission is not generally accessible to anyone other than the
intended recipients, and (5) the material is not modified by the
OSP. Nor will the OSP be liable for copyright infringement
through linking if (1) the OSP does not have actual knowledge
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nor is it aware of facts from which infringement is apparent, (2)
the OSP receives no direct financial benefit from the
infringement, and (3) upon notice of a claimed infringing
activity, the OSP acts expeditiously to remove or disable the link
to the infringing activity.
The Ninth Circuit, in Napster, applied the DMCA to the
facts in that case by holding that plaintiff music copyright
owners raised serious questions regarding Napster's ability to
qualify for immunity under the DMCA. Specifically, these
questions are whether Napster is an OSP, the nature of the
notice of copyright infringement required to establish Napster's
knowledge of infringing activity, and whether Napster created a
copyright compliance policy in a timely fashion. If the DMCA
had been in effect when Netcom was decided, Netcom would
likely have been able to take advantage of its protections if it had
complied with the removal requirements.
II.

TRADEMARK BASICS.

A. Definitions
A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof (used or intended to be used by a person) to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods.. . ."15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). A
trademark is protected against confusingly similar use in
connection with the sale of goods or services by others, and any
false implied endorsement of another's goods or services by the
trademark holder. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists,
courts may take into account (1) the degree of similarity between
the owner's mark and the alleged infringing mark; (2) the
strength of owner's mark; (3) the price of the goods and other
factors indicative of the care and attention expected of
consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the
defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the
mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods,
though not competing, are marketed through the same channels
of trade and advertised through the same media; (8) the extent
to which the targets of the parties' sale efforts are the same; (9)

42

CATHOLIC LAWYER, No.

1

the relationship of the goods in the minds of the public because
of the similarity of function; (10) other facts suggesting that the
consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a
product in the defendant's market. See also sections on Federal
Trademark Dilution Act and frequently asked questions about
trademarks on the United States Patent and Trademark Office
website at www.uspto.gov.
B. Case Law
[Playboy Enterprises v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, 1998 W.L.
767440 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Playboy Enterprises ("PEI") holds
trademark registrations for the Playboy mark and the rabbit
head design, and has used those marks in commerce throughout
the United States and in fifty other countries, including two of
its websites. Universal Tel-A-Talk operates a website which
offers a hardcore pornography subscription service. Universal
identifies its services as "Playboy's Private Collection," has the
Playboy trademark on every printed web page on its site and its
e-mail address, and has a link to PEI's website. PEI successfully
sued Universal for trademark infringement and trademark
dilution. The district court held that the public was likely to
confuse Universal's products with Playboy's, and awarded
statutory damages and attorney fees to PEI.
[]Mattel v. Jcom, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). Jcom operated a website, which sold sexually explicit
entertainment services, using the name "Barbie's Playhouse."
Jcom used a typeface and pink background color with the phrase
"Barbie's Playhouse" which was almost identical to the
trademark "Barbie" owned by Mattel, and displayed a doll-like
figure on the bottom of the website, which resembled a Barbie
doll. Mattel has held numerous trademark registrations for
"Barbie" since 1958. Mattel successfully sued for trademark
dilution, showing that it owned a famous mark and that Jcom
diluted it by tarnishment (association with an unwholesome
product). Jcom was permanently enjoined from diluting Mattel's
trademarks and ordered to disgorge its gross profits from the
website.
[]Christian Science Board of Directors v. Robinson, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 965 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
David Nolan headed an
organization,
the
Christian Science
University, which
established a website through a webmaster located in North
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Carolina. The Christian Science Board of Directors of the First
Church of Christ Scientist successfully obtained a judgment
against Nolan for trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act. Nolan appealed and sought a motion for stay of the
injunction against him. Nolan argued that the North Carolina
long-arm statute should not have been applied to him and that
his speech was religious and noncommercial and therefore the
Lanham Act did not apply to it. The district court rejected both
arguments.
The Lanham Act, stated the court, would not be triggered by
the use of a domain name that promotes or preaches social,
religious, or political beliefs unless there is some provision of
services or a commercial aspect to the website. The Lanham Act
prohibits the use "in commerce" of any reproduction or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion or deceive.
There is no profit requirement in the Lanham Act. Nolan's
website attempted to convince readers that his version of
Christian Science was the "true" version. His site used the
Christian Science name and its Cross and Crown registered
marks and advertised live chat rooms, weekly lectures, a campus
book store, and solicited contributions,
Thus, the court
concluded, Nolan offered his own set of services and his use of
plaintiffs mark is in connection with the distribution of his
services over the Internet. His infringing use of plaintiffs mark
was therefore "in commerce." The court also rejected Nolan's
argument that his use of plaintiffs mark is protected under the
First Amendment. The Christian Science Board of Directors has
not attempted to restrain Nolan's speech on any subject; it
merely sought to stop Nolan from using the Board's trademarks.
Nolan used plaintiffs marks not to convey information about the
Board, but to mislead the public as to the source of Nolan's
services.
E]Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates,135 F. Supp. 2d
409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Mindspring, an Internet Service Provider
("ISP"), provided web page hosting services, and Hall &
Associates used Mindspring to host its website. Gucci, the
holder of numerous trademark registrations for the mark "Gucci'
on wearing apparel, jewelry fashion accessories, and related
services, notified Mindspring twice that Hall was infringing
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Gucci's trademarks on Hall's website, and that Mindspring was
directly and contributorily infringing by hosting Hall's website.
Mindspring defended by arguing that section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000),
("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider."), immunizes
Mindspring against such claims. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected that defense. The court
held that the CDA did not immunize Mindspring because it also
provides, at § 230(e)(2), that it shall not be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property. Nor, the
court held, does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (passed
two years after the CDA; see section on DMCA above) immunize
Mindspring against a claim of trademark infringement. The
DMCA pertains only to immunity from copyright infringement
claims.
III.

POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR LINKING

Hypertext linking and framing are two ways websites can
Links are
connect the Internet user with other websites.
highlighted text, pictures, or logos which the user can click on in
order to access another website. A link can either take the user
to the homepage of another website (linking), or to a site "below"
the homepage or several levels into the linked site ("deep
linking"). Framing, on the other hand, allows the user to view
the contents of another website (the "framed" website) within the
borders of "framing" website. Thus, the contents of the framed
website are surrounded by the pictures and advertising of the
framing website.
Whether and to what extent links or deep links raise valid
copyright, trademark, and/or unfair competition claims is
somewhat unsettled. In general, a simple hyper-text link on one
website to another by itself does not give rise to a claim of
copyright, trademark, or unfair competition violation. It is
possible, however, to create the link with language or use of
trademarks which confuse the customer as to the source of goods
or services provided by the website operator and the linked-to
site. Further, state law defamation, false light, or similar claims
could be made depending on the language used on a website to
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describe a link to a website.
A photographer claimed that multiple links from one
website to a site containing his copyrighted photographs without
his permission constituted copyright infringement. That theory
was rejected by the district court.
Mere linking cannot
constitute direct infringement because the computer server of
the linking website does not make a copy of the linked-to
website. See Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
In a case not involving linking to material infringing
copyright, but a related copyright wrong, anti-circumvention, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined a
website operation from linking to other websites which posted
software which descrambled copyrighted digital versatile disks
(DVDs). See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). DVDs contain copyrighted motion
pictures and are protected against copying by an encryption
system called CSS. Computer hackers, including the defendant,
invented a computer program called DeCSS, which circumvents
the CSS system and permits the CSS-protected movies to be
copied and played. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) (see section on the DMCA above) prohibits the
circumvention of a technological protection measure put in place
by a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work and
the creation of and making available technologies developed to
defeat technological protections against unauthorized access to a
copyrighted work. "An essential ingredient... [in violating the

DMCA] is a desire to bring about the dissemination." See
Universal Cit Studios, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
Defendants posted DeCSS on their websites, and the district
court enjoined that posting as a violation of the DMCA's
prohibition on making available to the public an anticircumvention technology. Further, the court also enjoined
defendants from linking to other websites that post DeCSS. The
defendants actively encouraged other sites to post DeCSS. Some
of defendants links transfer a user to a website which contains a
variety of information, and which, on one of its pages, links to
another page on the same site which posts DeCSS. Other links
take a user directly to another website's pages which post
DeCSS. Other links directly transfer the user to a file on a
website, which immediately commences downloading DeCSS.
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The court held that, even in the case of the link to a website
which contains among its many pages a posting of DeCSS, all of
Specifically, these links
these links violated the DMCA.
provided or trafficked in anti-circumvention technology within
the meaning of the DMCA. Defendants encouraged other sites to
post the offending material, checked those sites to ensure that
they indeed posted it, and informed the public on their own
websites that the material was available on those websites.
Online service providers which link to websites or other
online resources containing material which infringe copyrights
may avail themselves of the safe harbor from copyright
infringement liability created by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). (See previous copyright
section).
Deep linking is problematic, however, because the linking
website can connect the user directly to the best or most
interesting contents of the website, thus reducing the amount of
In deep linking, a link
time spent at the linked website.
bypasses the home page of a website with its copyright notice,
disclaimers and identifiers, and links instead to internal pages.
This also reduces the amount of "hits" which the linked site
receives, in turn decreasing the value of advertising on, and
therefore the revenue of, the linked site. Deep linking has given
rise to legal action. Total News is a "metasite" which linked to
other news sites, surrounding the content from the other sites
The
with the Total News logo and its own advertisers.
Washington Post and other news organizations sued Total News
for trademark infringement and dilution. In the. settlement
agreement, Total News agreed to cease linking and framing to
defendants' sites in a way that suggested endorsement or
sponsorship. See Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No.
97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Feb. 20, 1997), dismissed
upon settlement, (June 5, 1997).
Ticketmaster has twice sued (and settled in its favor) two
website operators for creating deep links to Ticketmaster's
website. Microsoft linked to a page within Ticketmaster's site,
which contained no advertising and Ticketmaster sued, charging
Microsoft with trademark dilution and unfair competition.
Microsoft settled and agreed to link only to Ticketmaster's home
page. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97 Civ.
3055 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 28, 1997).
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In another dispute, Tickets.com created deep links to
Ticketmaster's internal website pages and Ticketmaster sued.
The court held that hyper linking does not itself involve a
violation of the Copyright Act since no copying is involved. The
customer is transferred to web pages of the original author. The
district court dismissed Ticketmaster's breach of contract claim,
holding that the "Terms and Conditions" posted on
Ticketmaster's website (which stated that deep linking was
prohibited) were not prominently displayed (they were at the
bottom of the page) and Ticketmaster did not require site visitors
to click onto the "Agree" button next to the "Terms and
Conditions." The court, however, granted Ticketmaster leave to
amend its complaint to claim that Tickets knew about the
"Terms and Conditions" and impliedly agree to them. The court
held that creating a link to interior pages, without other actions
attempting to confuse web users as to the source of the goods and
services discussed on the interior pages, does not constitute a
sufficient showing of unfair competition. See Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 525, 390 (C.D. Cal. March 27,
2000).
IV.

COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)
(2000): INTERACTIVE SERVICE PROVIDER IMMUNITY
FROM TORTS

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")
provides relief for providers of interactive computer services from
tort liability due to the actions of information content providers
(defined as any person or entity that is responsible in whole or in
part for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or other interactive computer service). 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2000). It does not limit or expand intellectual
property laws, and so does not provide immunity for copyright or
trademark violations.
The CDA immunized America Online from defamation
liability for the material published online by Matt Drudge, a
gossip columnist. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998). AOL licensed Drudge's electronic publication,
Drudge Report, for distribution to AOL's members. Under the
terms of that license, AOL had the right to remove content from
the Drudge Report, which it deems in violation of its terms of
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service.
The Drudge Report published a story accusing a
Presidential assistant, Sidney Blumenthal, of wife-beating, and
following a letter from the assistant's attorney, published a
retraction. AOL removed the original story from its electronic
archive. Blumenthal sued AOL for defamation; the district court
held that the CDA protected AOL from defamation liability.
"AOL was nothing more than a provider of an interactive
computer service on which the Drudge Report was carried, and
Congress has said quite clearly that such a provider shall not be
treated as a 'publisher or speaker' and therefore may not be held
liable in tort. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(1) (2000). Because it has the
right to exercise editorial control over those with whom it
contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would seem only
fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher
or, at least... to a distributor. But Congress has made a
different policy choice by providing immunity even where the
interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in
making available content prepared by others." Id. at 50-52.
V.

DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES

A. Federal TrademarkDilution Act
If a domain name includes a famous trademark, and a
similar domain name uses that mark, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act ("FTDA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000), may offer a
remedy. The FTDA makes actionable the use of a famous
trademark commercially to dilute the distinctive quality of the
famous mark. Unlike the showing required to prove trademark
infringement, proving dilution does not require proof that the
wrongdoer competes with the mark owner, nor that there is a
likelihood of consumer confusion.
Dilution requires only a
showing that the commercial use of a famous mark has lessened
the mark's capacity to distinguish it from marks on dissimilar
goods or goods of poor quality, or by associating the mark with
an unwholesome or disparaging message.
Whether a mark is famous and distinctive and is protected
by the FTDA is determined by reference to the following factors:
(1) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark; (2) the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is
used; (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
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the mark; (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used; (5) the channels of trade for the goods or
services with which the mark is used; (6) the degree of
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom
the injunction is sought; (7) the nature and extent of use of the
same or similar marks by third parties; and (8) whether the
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Remedies for dilution of a famous mark are an injunction,
or, if the dilution is willful, disgorgement of profits, payment of
damages and litigation costs, and destruction of goods bearing
the mark.
Fair use, noncommercial use, and news reporting use of a
mark that would otherwise dilute a famous mark are exempt.
B. Anti-CybersquattingConsumer ProtectionAct
A broader remedy against a domain name wrongdoer is the
Antithe
"Cybersquatting,"
against
prohibition
new
This
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA").
provides a statutory cause of action against persons who, in bad
faith, register domain names incorporating the trademarks of
others. Specifically, ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000), provides
remedies against persons who, in bad faith, register, traffic in, or
use a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a
distinctive or famous mark or which dilutes a famous mark or is
a trademark owned by another. Bad faith is determined by
examining factors such as: (1) whether the alleged squatter has a
trademark or other intellectual property claim to the domain
name; (2) whether the domain name is the legal name of the
alleged squatter; (3) any prior use of the domain name by the
alleged squatter; (4) whether the squatter makes a
noncommercial or fair use of the mark in the website identified
by the domain name; (5) the squatter's intent to divert
consumers from the website connected to the mark to the
squatter's site to harm the goodwill associated with the mark
with the intent of tarnishing or disparaging the mark, or of
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the website; (6) the alleged
squatter's offer to transfer the domain name to anyone for
financial gain without actually using the name; (7) the alleged
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squatter's providing false contact information when applying for
domain name registration; (8) the squatter's registration of
multiple domain names that he knows are identical or
confusingly similar to distinctive marks or are dilution of famous
marks; and (9) the extent to which the mark is not distinctive or
famous.
Remedies for cybersquatting are forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or transfer of the domain name
to the mark owner.
C. ICANN Dispute Resolution Process
To reduce litigation and time associated with civil actions
under the Trademark Act, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
and the Anti- Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") established a dispute resolution process for domain
name disputes.
See www.icann.org/udrp/Udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. ICANN was established as a non-profit corporation
to assume the United States government's domain name
management functions.
ICANN accredited four arbitration
forums to hear Internet domain name arbitration disputes: the
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, a unit of the
International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (based in Geneva, Switzerland), the National
Arbitration Forum (in Minneapolis, Minnesota), eResolution (in
Quebec); and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (New York).
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDNDP") is based on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
UDNDP's sole remedies are transfer of a domain name or
cancellation of a domain name; no monetary damages are
available. The arbitration process is usually completed within
weeks and costs much less than trademark litigation. Use of the
UDNDP procedure does not preclude a complainant or the
domain name holder from filing suit in any court based on
federal law. A complainant will prevail in a dispute if it can
show that a domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights,
the domain name registrant has no right or legitimate interests
in the domain name, and the registrant is using the domain
name in bad faith. Evidence of bad faith includes showing that
(1) a domain name registrant has acquired a domain name for
the purpose of selling it for more than out-of-pocket expenses to
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the complainant who owns the trade or service mark; (2) the
registrant registered the domain name to prevent a trademark
owner from registering the mark as domain name and the
registrant has a pattern of this behavior; (3) the registrant
registered the domain name to disrupt a competitor's business;
or (4) registrant uses the domain name to intentionally confuse
the public as to the affiliation of the website and draw web users
to the registrant's site for commercial gain. See the ICANN
website at www.icann.org.
VI.

CHILDREN'S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")
applies to any website that is directed at children or which
actually knows it is collecting or maintaining personal
information from a child (an email address and first and last
name are personal information). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505
(2000) (Children's Privacy Protection Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1312.12). COPPA prohibits such website operators from collecting
personal information without (1) providing notice on its website
about what information it collects from children and its
disclosure practices; (2) obtaining verifiable parental consent
prior to collecting or disclosing personal information; (3)
providing a reasonable means for a parent to review the personal
information collected from a child and to refuse to permit its
further use or maintenance; (4) not conditioning a child's
participation in an activity on the child's disclosing more
personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate
in that activity; and (5) establishing and maintaining reasonable
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity
of personal information collected from children.
Collecting information means gathering of any personal
information from a child by any means. Examples cited in the
regulations are (1) enabling children to make personal
information available publicly through a message board or chat
room, except where the operator deletes all identifiable
information from children's postings before they are made public,
and (2) linking personal information to an individual through a
cookie. See How to Comply with the Children's Online Privacy
Protection
Rule
available
at
www.ftc.gov/bcp/online/pubs/buspubs/coppa.pdf.
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The right of publicity, grounded in privacy law, is protected
in some states by common law, and in others by state law.1
Fundamentally, it protects an individual against unauthorized
commercial exploitation. The basic elements of the right of
privacy are set forth in the Restatement of Unfair Competition:
(1) the appropriation without consent (2) of the commercial value
of a person's identity (3) by use of the person's name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity (4) for purposes of trade. Restatement of
Unfair Competition, § 46 (1995). The use of sound-alike voices or
appearances in commercial uses also violates the right of
publicity. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951(1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992).
Even in states protecting the right of publicity, common
exceptions exist. These exceptions are (1) the right of publicity
ends at death (notable exceptions are California, Indiana, and
Tennessee); (2) protection exists only against commercial
advertising, not entertainment (even for-profit) uses; and (3)
preemption of the right by the Copyright Act. Generally, most
state laws (as well as common law) seek to balance the right of
publicity with the First Amendment rights inherent in news and
creative works (including entertainment works).
Even as news and entertainment merge, news uses of a
person's identity in a manner which otherwise would violate
publicity rights is protected. An electronic subscriber-based
bulletin board service devoted to news, games, and discussion
groups use of a photograph of Howard Stern, notorious radio
personality, to advertise its bulletin board service discussing
Stern's candidacy for governor of New York, fell within the state
right of publicity law's exception for news uses: "Although only
paid subscribers may access Delphi's on-line information services
from their computers or terminals, this service is analogous to
that of a news vendor or bookstore, or a letters-to-the-editor
column of a newspaper, which require purchase of their
materials for the public to actually gain access to the information
1 States with laws including right of publicity elements are: California,
Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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carried." See Stern v. Delphi Internet Services, 626 N.Y.S.2d 694
(Sup.Ct. N.Y. County 1995). That a news program generates
advertising revenue did not prevent a broadcast network from
availing itself of the news account exception to California right of
publicity law where the use made of a likeness was in connection
with a news account. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp 745,
754 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (use of footage with crime victim's face
visible in news magazine segment on victims assistance
programs).
Thus, a poster manufacturer's attempted
newsworthy-event defense to a complaint of violation of the right
of publicity failed when it printed and sold posters consisting of
the image of Elvis Presley, albeit with the words "In memoriam"
at the top of the poster. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
The use by a magazine of a still photo of an actress, taken from a
motion picture in which she was featured, to illustrate a story
about actresses who have appeared nude, was not a commercial
exploitation of her image but was a news-type use. See AnnMargaret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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